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What is the relationship between supervision and morality? Or to be more 
precise: What role and function may morality have in supervision? This pa-
per argues that framing this relationship as an issue of professional ethics 
is insufficient. Morality in supervision is not only a case of the supervisor’s 
professional ethics. An alternative conception, it is further argued, is super-
vision as a moral practice or activity. Such an understanding gives moral 
theory a more prominent place in supervision. The formulation of relevant 
moral theory, however, cannot be outsourced to academics. It has to be a 
joint communicative enterprise between theory that is developed in practice 
and in an academic setting.
An Ethics for Professionals
Ethics in supervision is often framed as professional ethics. Professional eth-
ics of supervision is often argued as ethics of rules, virtues, or care. The 
rule tradition manifests itself, for instance, in codes of professional ethics. 
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Moral autonomy is traditionally understood as one of the characteristics of 
the constitution of a profession.1 It is therefore important for a profession to 
establish an explicit code of conduct that regulates the relationship to clients 
and constitutes a societal contract. It is also vital for the profession to estab-
lish internal procedures for enforcing these rules.
A typical example of this ‘rule tradition’ is found in the American As-
sociation of Pastoral Counselors Code of Ethics.2 Some of the rules are quite 
specific:
(PRINCIPLE VII–ADVERTISING):
G. Upon the transfer of a pastoral counseling practice or the sale of real, person-
al, tangible or intangible property or assets used in such practice, the privacy 
and well being of the client shall be of primary concern.
a. Client names and records shall be excluded from the transfer or sale.
b. Any fees paid shall be for services rendered, consultation, equipment, real 
estate, and the name and logo of the counseling agency.
c. We provide recent and current clients information regarding the closing or 
transferring of our practice and assure the confidentiality of their records.
Other rules start out quite general, with a continued operationalization and 
specification, such as:
(PRINCIPLE III–CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS):
A. We do not abandon or neglect clients. We make reasonable efforts to ensure 
continuity of services in the event that services are interrupted by factors 
such as unavailability, relocation, illness, or disability. If we are unwilling for 
appropriate reasons, to provide professional help or continue a professional 
relationship, every reasonable effort is made to arrange for continuation of 
treatment with another professional. Prior to leaving an agency or practice 
we complete all files and paper work is documented and signed.
Most professional ethics codes are like this illustration from AAPC: 
they are in the form of moral rules which aim at maintaining boundaries 
for professional behavior. Some may also have a language of virtues that in-
clude descriptions of the good supervisor. And in some cases, certain values 
are given as aims for professional behavior. The problem with the language 
of virtue and values in professional ethics codes is that they are imprecise 
standards for behavior. Virtue focuses the attention to the person, not the 
action only. And values may be reflected in a number of actions as long as 
they maximize the value or aim. The societal function of codes of profes-
sional ethics is to make transparent standards for professional behavior to 
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clients and the society in general. This leads to standards written in the form 
of rules.
The alternative forms of professional ethics, virtue, and care, are pri-
marily found in academic texts.3 These texts try to establish alternative mor-
al perspectives for the professional and for the relationship between, here, 
supervisor and supervisee. I will return later to moral theories and supervi-
sion. Here the point is simply to claim that these traditional approaches to 
supervision ethics frame the role of the moral in supervision in terms of pro-
fessional ethics. This means that the object of the moral is the professional 
or the supervisor. Rules address certain behavior on the supervisor’s part. 
The purpose of rules is to establish boundaries for the supervisor’s actions. 
Virtue ethics work more broadly on the development of the character of the 
supervisor. Care theory expands the field of the moral to the dyadic relation 
between the supervisor and the supervisee. These expansions are valuable 
and fruitful, but insufficient. Supervision is more than the actions of the su-
pervisor, her character and the immediate relationship between supervisor 
and supervisee. The consequence of limiting the morality of supervision to 
professional ethics is that larger fields of supervision as social and historical 
practice are left out of moral perception.
The problem in this standard approach to supervision and ethics is 
that one begins at the wrong end of things by starting in moral theory and 
working towards an application in the practice of supervision. This appli-
cation may be done explicitly or implicitly. Some texts discuss practice at 
great length, but rarely are the moral resources located in practice. Practice 
is more understood as a field of complex moral challenges in which ethical 
choices have to be made.
I suggest working from a different angle. The practice turn of contem-
porary theory4 made apparent the resources of social and historical practic-
es. This leads to an investigation of the moral resources in supervision itself 
as practice and activity. Still, I would argue that an inductive, ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective is problematic. What is needed, as I shall argue in this essay, 
is a dialectical or dynamic interaction between supervision as practice and 
moral theory. I will do this in two steps. First I will present a theory of prac-
tice and activity and analyze supervision as a moral activity. Secondly, I will 
try to establish a dialogue between the moral resources of supervision and 
moral theory.
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A Dialectical Methodology
Methodologically, the paper is different from two other approaches. In the 
first approach, theories of duty, rules, virtue, or care are established and 
then applied to the practice of supervision. The direction is from theory to 
practice. The design of this relationship between theory and practice (and 
data) is top-down or deductive. The second methodological approach may 
be called bottom-up or inductive. The aim is to analyze the morality in 
supervision, using ethnographic or phenomenological methods. The third 
methodology, which is used in this paper, may be called dialectic and her-
meneutical. The assumption is that any understanding of practice is theory-
laden, and that any theoretical account works on assumptions of reality 
and social practices. Neither academic theory nor social practices are given 
primacy.5
A few words on terminology are, however, necessary. I use the con-
cepts ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ synonymously. The reason for this lies in the 
understanding the relationship of ‘theory’ and ‘practice.’ Theory is used to 
identify more or less systematic narratives on phenomena and experiences. 
This means that theory may develop in different social practices, such as 
research, academics, faith communities, everyday life, and so on. It follows 
that one can distinguish between moral practice and moral theory. Moral 
theory can take place in different practices—philosophy and theology on 
one hand and supervision and education on the other. Implicit in this con-
ception is the idea that the development of theory is distributed in and be-
tween different social practices, and not a property of research and academ-
ics alone.6 This said, research and academics are vital producers of theory 
and epistemic knowledge.7 However, theory is not solely generated in re-
search and then distributed to and consumed by fields of practice.8
Practice and Activity: Supervision is Like a Play
What does it mean that supervision is a practice or an activity? Initially it 
is fruitful to distinguish between practice as simply ‘doing’ and practice as 
“arrays of human activity.”9 This corresponds to the distinction between ‘ac-
tion’ and ‘activity.’ An action is an isolated, intentional event by an agent. A 
question a supervisor poses to a supervisee is an action. An activity is his-
torical, collective, and has an objective.10
The historical aspect means that supervision is established as a prac-
tice before a person starts to supervise. A supervisor enters supervision as a 
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historically and socially defined practice. As a supervisor one does not con-
struct supervision from scratch. One enters a practice that has developed in 
time and space, and is still emerging and becoming. So understood, supervi-
sion as an activity is a play with a script and the supervisor is an actor.
Like a play, an activity is a collective enterprise. One normally acts with 
other actors, and certainly with a script, an audience, a director, a scene, ma-
terial objects on the scene, and so on. This means that in order to understand 
the play, one cannot analyze only the actor. Everything the actor does is re-
lational: it is a response to someone or something else.11 Supervision as an 
activity can therefore not be understood or reduced to the actions of the su-
pervisor. It is a collective activity, a play. The most interesting things happen 
in the relations, in the space between, in inter-action.
An activity is constituted by objects.12 The object of an activity is more 
than the sum of individual goals and aims. The object lies in the history of 
the activity and it is always emerging. The object is the existing production 
of the activity, but also the potential of production.
This distinction between supervision as action and practice-acts on one 
hand and as activity and social and historical practice on the other is of sig-
nificant analytical value. It is decisive for how, and at what level, we analyze 
supervision—and it is vital for where we locate morality. The question is: 
should morality primarily be analyzed on the level of action, on the level of 
individual actors, the level of dyadic relations, or on the level of activity or 
practice?
Supervision and CHAT
Experience takes place with the help of cultural and material tools. These 
tools are not neutral carriers. They constitute, condition, translate, and 
transform the experience. I will elaborate on activity and practice, using 
Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT), particularly in the version of 
yrjö Engeström13 in the tradition of Lev Vygotsky.14 Vygotsky’s insight was 
that human beings experience the world indirectly. This understanding of 
mediation is different from another use of the concept. Mediate may also 
mean the process of handing over something from a-to-b, without changing 
the mediated content. In CHAT mediation is understood in a strong sense, 
there is a triangular relationship between the experiencing subject, tools and 
the world (figure 1).
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Tools
 Subject The World
Figure 1. An illustration of the tool-dependent activity of experiencing the 
world and of learning, in the tradition of Vygotsky. ‘The World’ is 
used in the sense of the sum of all potential ‘objects.’
The two main categories of tools are cultural signs and symbols (includ-
ing language) and material tools. Another concept for tools is artifact. Arti-
facts have a hybrid character, webs of material, and symbolic aspects. That 
is, material artifacts have historical meaning. A couch in a therapist’s office is 
such a material artifact, loaded with historical meaning. It puts the therapist 
and the client in certain positions and roles, it directs the play between them. 
Language is also an artifact. This means that language is not understood as 
representational, but as mediational and performative. Language opens up 
and closes the world: it creates different realities. This is not understood in a 
strong social constructivist sense. There is always a relationship between the 
world, language, and the actors. But the relationship is never direct or final—
it is indirect and finite.15 In supervision language is a tool, a mediating arti-
fact. It carries meaning and meaning potential into supervision. At the same 
time it gets meaning through use in practices, as supervision.
Artifacts are not individual, internalized properties. They are external, 
out there, in the space between actors and between actors and the world. A 
number of material artifacts may be used in supervision, a diary, a letter, a 
drawing, an image, a video recording. Artifacts may also be mainly sym-
bolic. They may, however, get a more or less materialized form. Accounts of 
persons, activities, and situations may enter supervision, and they may in 
time get an external existence. A child, a critical incident—everything can 
become an artifact in an ongoing supervision, a tool that is used to think, 
feel, and act with. These symbolic artifacts can be introduced by any par-
ticipant in supervision, but they are created and shaped in the interaction.
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In this perspective supervision is always an indirect and relational ac-
tivity. Engeström calls such activities activity systems, illustrated in figure 2.
Figure 2. The basic structure of an activity system according to 
Engeström.16
Supervision is an activity system and the subjects of the activity are normal-
ly the supervisors and the supervisees. These persons and the other persons 
in the supervising practice constitute a community of supervision. A division 
of labor is continuously negotiated between the different participants, in 
particular between supervisor and supervisee. This depends on the role of 
the supervisor, but the role is always relational to and a response to the su-
pervisee’s positioning—and vice versa. Explicit and tacit rules regulate the 
relationship between subjects and the supervising community. Rules ‘fol-
low’ the practice as a historical activity, but are also negotiated in action. 
This means that rules and division of labor also can be understood as me-
diating phenomena in supervision. Mediational artifacts are therefore not 
limited to tools and signs (see figure 2).
How the Activity of Supervision Develops
Last, but not least, supervision has an outcome. Supervision has an actual 
and potential object and purpose. In most cases supervision aims for better 
practice in another activity, for instance pastoral work, personal relations, 
or doing research. This other practice may also be understood as an activity 
system. The pastor’s activity system is the congregation or the hospital and 
the PhD student’s activity system is the research community she is partici-
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pating in and contributing to. These activities have their own rules, division 
of labor, objects, subjects, language, and other artifacts. The purpose with 
supervision is to enable the supervisee to understand and act better in this 
second activity.
Such a perspective has a number of consequences. First, the supervis-
ee is not simply an isolated individual professional but is a participant in a 
relational, historical, and collective activity. Second, the supervisee partici-
pates in this second activity using mediating artifacts. This means that su-
pervision should not only be directed to some internal, cognitive, or emo-
tional change within the supervisee. Change occurs in the relation between 
subject and cultural tool. This means, third, that supervision is a quest for 
better artifacts—tools and signs, objects, and language. This is a matter of 
expansion. In bringing the second activity into supervision, the search is for 
expansion of existing practices and artifacts. An activity is always emerging. 
It is developing and can be developed through expansion of artifacts and 
objects. This is what supervision often is about, an attempt to dialogically 
re-describe practice in such a way that it opens up possibilities for actions, 
understanding and emotions.
Such an understanding of supervision has consequences for the nor-
mative17 role of the supervisor. On one hand, the supervisor cannot pre-
scribe better practice for the supervisee. This is because one cannot prescribe 
participation in an activity system. There is a script and a scene, but there are 
numerous ways to perform and create. Furthermore, normativity is not only 
on the supervisee’s side. Normative resources are in between and are cre-
ated dialogically between supervisor and supervisee. Understood this way, 
normativity is created as a possibility—as an emerging space. It cannot be 
created in the second activity; therefore it has the form of language, a story, 
a theoretical distinction—or a drawing, a video recording, a written con-
tract, tears, or a very special stone. Normativity, in this sense, enables and 
restricts. Normativity is not only a question of ideas, it has a material side. 
It comes in a real form: there are moral bodies and tools, words, stories, and 
images. It is a complex relationship between the material and the symbolic 
which creates possibility of normative meaning. And this potential norma-
tive meaning is created and negotiated in activity. Normativity is relational, 
in between, external, objective, and negotiated in action.
Supervision on this account has a trialogical structure. The object of su-
pervision is not the internal emotions or cognition of the supervisee. It is 
neither a pure, dyadic relationship between supervisor and supervisee. It is 
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an indirect relation and, better, a mediating activity, constituted by symbolic 
and material artifacts.18 The supervisor is free to contribute to normative re-
sources and normative artifacts that have the potential of developing and im-
proving the activity of the supervisee in a qualitative sense. By externalizing 
normative resources and artifacts, the normativity of the supervisor is not an 
act of imposing on the supervisee. Normative artifacts are ‘placed in the mid-
dle,’ in between the supervisor and the supervisee and this is done in a dia-
logical manner. The normative artifacts must be understood as fruitful by the 
supervisee, as tools constituting good practice. This does not exclude critical 
and provocative artifacts. The point is that the supervisee must be able to see 
the constructive critical potential in these. Potentiality is created in dialogue, 
or to be more exact, trialogue between supervisor, supervisee, and artifact.
This means that the disharmonic, multi-voiced, and tensional character 
of supervision as activity and practice cannot be understood as an issue be-
tween two subjects. Artifacts are the third subject. It might be that artifacts 
create tensions. They may challenge and create a situation of disjunction, 
even chaos—between tool and supervisee, between tool and supervisor and 
in their collective use of the tool. Such a state has a related aspect of power. 
How are the power relations influential in introducing, working with, and 
molding artifacts? How do the artifacts resist molding or how do they strike 
back? How do artifacts position the participants in supervision? Artifacts 
can be used to reconfigure power relations.19 Power is then not understood 
as a personal possession or a dyadic relation. Power is an aspect of supervi-
sion as a trialogical and dynamic relation. Tension and disjunction are not 
negative states as such, they are moments of potential change and learning.
Practical, Objective, and Mediational
Based on the previous analysis, I claim that morality in supervision is a) 
practical, b) objective, and c) mediational. That morality in supervision is 
practical means that it is not primarily grand theory, but located in everyday 
life, in the finite practice of supervision. The practical aspect of morality 
is not an application of theory but rather it is enacted life in historical and 
culturally constituted activities. Practice is not the same as an action: it is 
complex and relational activity. Entering supervision means entering a field 
with many, complex, and changing conditions.
Supervision as a practice consists of natural and material objects, of 
bodies, chairs, images, watches, paper, and texts. It is objective.20 Even the 
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oral dialogue between the participants has an objective aspect. And all these 
objects are in motion, the handshake, the smile, the look at the watch, the 
drawing of the patient, and words spoken. Morality is in all this objectivity 
and symbolic interaction. At the same time, the material carries meaning 
and worth. Objects open up and restrict meaning and value. At the same 
time, what is material may be transformed by powerful symbolic meaning. 
For example, consideration of a situation from work gives worth, value, and 
meaning to the supervisee. At the same time, symbolic reshaping of the ma-
terial, can open up new possibilities of value and meaning.
To put it bluntly, morality comes in things and objects—in this broad 
sense, which includes bodies and the frequency of speech. And since the ob-
jects are in motion, morality is in the movement, intersection, and direction 
of objects. This is contrary to a more conventional or idealist sense of moral-
ity as consisting of rules, values, and virtues. Rules are, however, spoken or 
written, values are words and narratives, and virtues have biographies. In 
this sense, there is a materiality to morality. When morality is understood 
as human ideas and moral actions are the application of these ideas, the 
objective aspect of morality is domesticated to ideas, idealized and then 
instrumentalized.
The key question here is this: how is morality objectively constituted 
in supervision? What kind of moral objectivity exists and is put into play? 
This is an empirical question, but also a theoretical and normative one: What 
kind of possibilities and potential does this moral objectivity have?
This leads to a second sense of object, the direction and purpose of 
supervisory practice. Supervision produces an object and this, obviously, 
concerns the question of good which is a moral question. What does super-
vision work towards? Is the end result of supervision of value to other prac-
tices? The direction is not always clear or in a straight line and certainly not 
instrumental. Still, supervision is walking along a path and changing paths. 
The question of good concerns the walking as well as the direction, because 
walking and direction is interlinked—and as the participants walk, they in-
teract with the environment in ways that imply changing. These are moral 
interactions and changes.
Morality in supervision is mediational. Mediation is here used in a 
strong sense. This means that the moral objects of supervision can be un-
derstood as artifacts, as tools that participants can use in different practices 
and activities. These moral artifacts are sorts of extensions of our bodies. We 
use them as cultural-material tools in order to act, think, and feel; that is, to 
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participate in activities. At the same time the moral artifacts constitute the 
supervisor and supervisee as moral actors. The moral artifacts are appro-
priated. This is not the same as internalization and domestication of moral 
objects. Moral artifacts are different from human actors, but with increased 
skills they become as if they were a part of the body.
The Contribution of Rules to Moral Activity in Supervision
If my analysis of supervision as moral activity is accurate, and if morality 
in supervision is practical, objective, and mediational, then how and where 
does more traditional moral theory enter this account? What might be the 
contribution of moral theory to supervision as moral activity? The emphasis 
remains on the contribution to the practical, objective and mediational char-
acter of morality in supervision.
The classic moral theory of Immanuel Kant emphasizes the morality 
of rules, law and duty. The aim of this moral tradition is to create princi-
ples and maxims that have objective, in the sense of universal, validity.21 
This gives an external status of moral rules and laws, an object in the space 
between human actors. The mediational potential of rules consists in their 
challenging the participants in supervision to expand their vision from the 
immediate to external relations and responsibility. Supervision is a practice 
of several tensions—between proximity and distance, between attachment 
and detachment, between support and criticism, and so on. These tensions 
belong to the historical and cultural activity of supervision. They cannot be 
resolved without dissolving supervision, but they demand to be negotiated. 
Moral rules are valuable tools in these negotiations. Moral rules function as 
mediational artifacts that can be used to act, feel, and reflect with.
In the example at the beginning of this essay, the rules of the American 
Association of Pastoral Counselors are textual objects and artifacts. These 
rules enter the space in between the participants of supervision. Because 
rules are agents with a life of their own, with their own agendas and mean-
ing, they are not only instruments that agents use but they may strike back. 
They have power, value and meaning to challenge. They are objects that 
have meaning and they also get meaning in the practice of supervision. 
They open up and restrict and they challenge.
Still, the rules cannot be applied; they can only be used. This gives 
a clue to the limitation of the morality of rules and law. Rules and prin-
ciples are not universal but they do have an objectivity in time and space. 
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This means that some rules are used more frequently than others. Some are 
actually not used at all, perhaps because they have no mediational poten-
tial. Old rules disappear, new emerge. Some rules get a political function, 
for instance in the process of professionalization. Other rules are more or 
less tacit. Rules are in process, in making. They change as a result of both 
the politics and practice of supervision. Rules find their practical validity in 
use. Understanding the morality of law and principles as mediating artifacts 
means that rules are put into motion and negotiated. Still, rules are of lim-
ited benefit in supervision as a moral activity.
Trust and Care: The Moral Demand of the Other
Making morality into rules is an irresponsible reduction of the moral charac-
ter of human life, it may be claimed. Morality is no additive to everyday life 
because it comes with being. Morality is here, it only needs to be perceived. 
This is the contribution of Knud Løgstrup to a care tradition of moral theory. 
Human relationships require trust. Human beings do not act on systematic 
and fundamental distrust. In all human encounters, something of ‘the other’ 
is placed into my hands. This ‘something’ demands responsibility; and trust 
is the basic characteristic of the relationship. Trust and responsibility is an 
ethical demand although it can be violated.
In other words, the demand implicit in every encounter between persons 
is not vocal but is and remains silent. The individual to whom this de-
mand is directed must him or herself in each concrete relationship decide 
what the content of the demand is. This is not to say that a person can 
arbitrarily and capriciously determine the content of the demand. In that 
event there would be no demand. But the fact is that there is a demand. 
And since the demand is implied by the very fact that a person belongs 
to the world in which the other person has his or her life, and therefore 
holds something of that person’s life in his or her hands, it is therefore a 
demand to take care of that person’s life. But nothing is thereby said about 
how this caring is to be done.
The other person him or herself cannot say anything about this, even 
though he or she is the one directly concerned, since, as we said before, 
it might very well involve something diametrically opposed to his or her 
own expectations and wishes. It is of the essence of the demand that with 
such insight, imagination, and understanding as he or she possesses a 
person must figure out for him or herself what the demand requires.22
This text seems to have great potential for supervision as moral practice. In 
supervision, parts of the life of the supervisee are put in the hands of the su-
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pervisor. This is not an act done by the supervisee; it simply is an aspect of 
human encounters. At the same time, it is a moral fact and a moral demand, 
because the supervisor has a radical responsibility for this part of the super-
visee’s life in his hands. The moral demand is there as a part of existence: it 
simply has to be seen or perceived—it may be overlooked and responsibility 
may not be taken.
This demand is silent. It is not expressed by the supervisee or some ex-
ternal rules. Furthermore, the demand is not reciprocal. I have responsibility 
for the things put in my hand, independent of your acts of responsibility and 
irresponsibility. The ethical demand is given, silent, and radically personal. 
The supervisor can respond to this ethical demand in many ways. There is 
no prescription in the demand itself for how it is to be directed. The demand 
is neither to do what the supervisee wishes. The demand is radically to care 
and be responsible.
Such a moral theory opens up the scope of the moral. Morality is not 
restricted to rules and action. Morality is connected to perception, respon-
sibility, and adequate response. What this moral theory mediates is the fun-
damental ethical character of the supervisor-supervisee relationship. There 
is a radical demand for responsibility on both sides, for the supervisee as 
well as the supervisor—and this demand is independent of the other’s ac-
tions. Placing moral demand on the supervisee side does not reduce moral 
responsibility for the supervisor. In both cases the moral demand is radical.
The moral quality of supervision is, however, only available through 
perception. This stands in contrast to a cognitive tradition in moral theo-
ry, where emphasis is put on rational justification and the understanding 
of moral values and rules. If the supervisor does not see, hear, and sense 
the supervisee, she will not be able to recognize the moral demand or re-
spond accordingly. Moral sensitizing is therefore a condition to act ethically 
in supervision.
What must be seen is the ‘something’ that is put in the other’s hands in 
supervision. This is a metaphor, Løgstrup says, and in his theory the ‘thing’ 
in the hands soon dissolves or is transformed into an existential moral de-
mand. There might be reasons to let the things, or objects, stay in the hands 
of the supervisor and supervisee. It might even be put on the table between 
them. Such a modification does not change the responsibility for the object 
and the relationship between object and participants. The supervisor has re-
sponsibility for the objects the supervisee ‘puts on the table.’ Through this 
responsible handling, a climate of trust is developed. This is empirical, not 
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ontological, trust. The moral demand on both sides of the supervising ta-
ble, is to introduce, work on, supplement, reduce, maximize, challenge, and 
criticize objects on the table. In order to do this the supervisor must see the 
supervisee, and imagine how the object may be of help for the supervisee.
However, there is more to morality in supervision than this. Rules and 
dyadic care places the moral in action and in the immediate I-you relation-
ship. As argued above, morality in supervision also lies in supervision as 
historical and cultural practice and activity. The supervisor and supervisee 
enter an activity that carries certain ways of doing, valuing and understand-
ing. The supervisor enters a moral space. This means that supervision is not 
an empty field where participants can act morally. Moral standards, stan-
dards of excellence, ways of seeing, and valuing, are all inherent in supervi-
sion as historical practice.
Virtues and Practices
In order to expand the moral scope of supervision, other kinds of theories is 
necessary. One valuable contribution is Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory of vir-
tues.23 MacIntyre’s concern is that contemporary moral theory is too thin and 
that moral practice in late modern societies is esthetic and ‘emotive’ more 
than informed, reflective, and argumentative. Morality has to be integrated 
into persons’ lives. It has to be a way of living if the courage needed can be 
mobilized in situations where moral integrity is seriously tested. MacIntyre 
draws on the tradition of virtue ethics. Morality concerns identity and the 
quality and character of the person—not isolated actions. As moral resourc-
es, the rules in the American Association of Pastoral Counselors Code of Ethics 
are far from strong enough. They presuppose a moral character, a moral way 
of living, and performing a profession—and the quality of moral character 
will override rules. The consequence for supervision is therefore an empha-
sis more on virtues, character, and identity than rules.
Still, MacIntyre’s scope is not at all as individualistic as at seems from 
the account above. In traditional virtue theory following Aristotle, the re-
sources of the development of virtues is found in nature and the teleologi-
cal character of nature, including human nature. Modern natural science 
stripped nature of teleology, which brought virtue theory into problems and 
idealist positions. Since virtues are not real, they can only be argued as ideal. 
The problem is that moral philosophy turned solely normative. With radical 
normal plurality, morality became a matter of belief and taste. MacIntyre’s 
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project is to bridge the separation between the real and ideal, facts and val-
ues, is and ought: “Abstract changes in moral concepts are always embodied 
in real, particular events.”24 This means that moral resources are integrated 
in social, human practices. Social practices have internal goods and emerg-
ing standards of excellence. And since there is no fundamental distinction 
between practices and theories, theories of social practices are potentially 
moral resources.
Saying “he is a ‘supervisor’” about a colleague may mean that he is a 
supervisor, but not a good supervisor. The concept of supervisor is not only 
descriptive; it contains an image of the good. The person that is referred to 
may formally be a supervisor, but for some reason people question his prac-
tice, whether he is supervisor in a qualified sense. It is the historical practice 
of supervision that has constituted this conception of practical excellence.
MacIntyre’s theory may be used as mediational tool in supervision. It 
opens up the, often silent and tacit, moral resources in supervision as activ-
ity. It makes the participants aware that entering supervision is a question 
of socialization and learning a practice. It may also help the understanding 
of objectivity as purpose. The purpose is in the doing and participating in 
the activity, not external to it. As a supervisor I commit myself to the com-
munity of supervision.
Two points can be made at the conclusion of this second section of the 
paper. First, Kantian theory, Løgstup and MacIntyre all contribute to under-
standing the moral aspects of supervision. They address somewhat differ-
ent aspects, in somewhat different ways. None of these theories cover the 
totality and the complexity of the practice. A variety of moral theories are 
necessary in order to understand supervision. There is no ‘grand theory’ of 
the moral aspects of supervision. Different theories give affordances to the 
practice and understanding of supervision. The theories are not true or good 
in themselves. Their validity is related to their potentiality in use.
Secondly, traditional moral theories cannot be used in any direct sense 
in supervision. The usefulness of moral theories depends on how they con-
tribute to the dialogue with the internal moral aspects of supervision. The 
validity of moral theory is dependent on their contribution to the under-
standing of the objective, practical, and meditational character of morality 
in supervision.
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Conclusion
The question asked in this paper is how one may understand the moral as-
pects of supervision. I have argued that supervision is a moral activity. I will 
summarize the argument in five steps.
1. Supervision is a morally loaded practice. Opposite views would locate mo-
rality in the periphery of supervision. Moral resources would be located in 
traditional moral philosophy, that is, external to the practice of supervision. 
My argument is for an expansion of the moral in supervision. This means 
that supervision may be understood as for instance a psychological, edu-
cational, sociological, theological, and moral practice. There is no particular 
moral domain in supervision. Everything in supervision has a potential mor-
al aspect. First, and foremost, the moral concerns supervision as a quest for 
the good.
2. The moral in supervision should not be limited to issues of professional eth-
ics. Morality should neither be restricted to the actions or character of the su-
pervisor, nor the purely, dyadic relationship between supervisor and super-
visee. The historical and social activity of supervision carries with it practices 
and conceptions of the good.
3. Since supervision as practice carries with it conceptions of the good; moral 
resources are found in supervision itself. These resources are both real and 
ideal. Morality is not only a matter of ideas; it comes in the form of matter. 
The matter of supervision is everything that is put in between the partici-
pants. The challenge is to analyze the moral dimension of everything that 
is put in the space in-between in supervision, that is, symbolic and material 
tools and artifacts. The moral resources of supervision are not a property of 
the supervisor or supervisee. The good comes in the form of artifacts that are 
used and negotiated in practice.
4. Moral artifacts like language, video, drawings, and couches are used in su-
pervision. However, the moral artifacts cannot be used for everything. They 
strike back. They carry historical and practical meaning. Moral objects are 
mediating artifacts in supervision as meditational activity. Supervision as 
moral activity is objective, practical, and meditational.
5. Traditional, philosophical and theological, moral theory may contribute 
to supervision as moral practice. Moral theory cannot be implemented to 
practice. It may, however, expand the objective, practical, and meditational 
character of supervision. This means that moral theory both is devalued and 
revalued. It is devalued from the position as the sole provider of moral re-
sources. There are reasons, however, to revalue moral theory. Moral theories 
may work at their best when they are used as mediating artifacts in supervi-
sion. At its best, moral theory is a quest not for the bad but for the good.
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